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HEREIN OF “HEREIN GRANTED”: WHY
ARTICLE I’S VESTING CLAUSE DOES
NOT SUPPORT THE DOCTRINE OF
ENUMERATED POWERS
Richard Primus*
INTRODUCTION
Article I of the United States Constitution begins as follows:
“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States[.]”1 That text is sometimes called
the Vesting Clause,2 or, more precisely, the Article I Vesting
Clause, because Articles II and III also begin with Vesting
Clauses.3 And there is a feature of those three clauses, when
compared, to which twenty-first century constitutional lawyers
commonly attribute considerable significance. Although the three
Clauses are similar in other ways, the syntax of Article I’s Vesting
Clause is not fully parallel to that of the other two. The Vesting
Clauses of Articles II and III say, respectively, that “The
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America”4 and “The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the

* Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor, The University of Michigan Law
School. I thank Cade Boland, Ruby Emberling, Jonathan Gienapp, Kaley Hanenkrat,
John Mikhail, Julian Mortenson, Virginia Neisler, William Treanor, Adam Wallstein,
Audrey Springer-Wilson, and the participants in the 2019 University of Wisconsin Law
School Constitutional Law Schmooze, organized by David Schwartz. Research for this
Article was funded in part by the Cook Endowment at the University of Michigan Law
School.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
2. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1729 (2002) (using this nomenclature).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America.”); id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.”).
4. Id. art. II, § 1.
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Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”5 They do
not say that the President and the courts exercise the executive
and judicial powers “herein granted.”
Working from the intuition that that difference in language
must be meaningful, several leading professors of constitutional
law have adopted what I will call the enumerationist reading of
Article I’s Vesting Clause.6 According to the enumerationist
reading, it matters that Article I’s Vesting Clause speaks of
powers “herein granted” rather than saying, in parallel with the
other clauses, something like “The legislative power shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States.” To say “The legislative
power shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,” this line
of thinking runs, would be to say that Congress enjoys legislative
power in general. To say instead that Congress is invested with
the “legislative powers herein granted,” the argument continues,
is to say that the legislative power granted to Congress is limited
in a way that the executive and judicial powers granted to the
other branches are not. Rather than exercising general legislative
power, Congress is entitled to exercise only those legislative
powers herein granted—that is, in the enumerationist
understanding, those powers affirmatively specified in the text of
the Constitution.7
A recent formulation of the point by Lawrence Lessig is
illustrative:

5. Id. art. III, § 1.
6. For a methodologically and politically diverse sample, see LAWRENCE LESSIG,
FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 75 (2019); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789
(3d ed. 2000) (“Article I, § 1 endows Congress not with ‘all legislative power,’ but only with
the ‘legislative Powers herein granted.’”); Randy E. Barnett, The Continuing Relevance of
the Original Meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2017);
Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of
Executive Power, 106 CAL. L. REV. 1, 19 (2018); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing
the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1894 (2005).
7. This enumerationist reading of the Vesting Clause goes beyond what might be
called the partial-power reading. On the partial-power reading, the fact that Article I,
Section 1 speaks of “legislative powers,” plural, rather than “legislative power”—the latter
of which would be parallel to the language of Articles II and III—signals that Congress is
vested with something less than plenary legislative jurisdiction. But that proposition alone
does not entail the further proposition that the legislative jurisdiction with which Congress
is vested is limited to the specific grants affirmed in the Constitution’s text. It is the words
“herein granted” that are commonly said to establish the latter proposition (and, thus, to
reinforce the first one). The enumerationist reading takes the clause to establish both
points.
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[T]he federal government, unlike state governments, has only
the powers that are delegated to it by the Constitution. The
Framers made this idea explicitly clear in Article I, where they
wrote, “Congress has the powers herein granted.” “Herein
granted”—not any power you might imagine a government to
have; just those powers specified in the Constitution.8

Note that in Lessig’s presentation, the principle that
Congress may exercise only the specific powers mentioned in the
Constitution is not an inference from the text of the Vesting
Clause. It is the plain meaning of the text: the language makes the
point “explicitly clear.”9
But it doesn’t. It doesn’t even come close.
This Article explains why the Vesting Clause of Article I does
not establish, or even support, the idea that Congress may
exercise only its constitutionally enumerated powers. To be sure,
that idea—for ease of reference, the enumeration principle—
might be correct even if the Vesting Clause lends it no support.
The enumeration principle might rest instead on the text of the
Tenth Amendment,10 or the architecture of Article I, Section 8,11
or a proposition about federalism,12 or a traditional understanding
going back to the Founding.13 As it happens, and for reasons I
have explained elsewhere, those other possible bases for the
enumeration principle are also much weaker than commonly
recognized.14 The project of this paper, however, is not to

8. LESSIG, supra note 6, at 75.
9. Id.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”).
11. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, “Resolution VI”: The Virginia Plan and Authority to
Resolve Collective Action Problems under Article I, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2123 (2012) (arguing that the fact that Section 8 is written as a list of particular powers
indicates that Congress does not have general legislative power).
12. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 225 (2011) (“[A]ction that exceeds
the National Government’s enumerated powers undermines the sovereign interests of
States.”).
13. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 535 (2012) (opinion
of Roberts, C.J.) (offering the traditional account on which the Framers wrote a
Constitution without a Bill of Rights because they trusted the enumeration of
congressional powers to do the work of limiting government).
14. See generally Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576
(2014) (challenging structural, historical and textual rationales for the enumeration
principle); Richard Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2016)
(offering an alternative account of the function that the enumeration principle plays in
constitutional culture); Richard Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 567
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challenge the enumeration principle as a whole. It is to attack,
frontally and thoroughly, one of the supports on which that
principle is said to rest. If the attack succeeds, perhaps readers will
be more willing to consider the possibility that the enumeration
principle’s other supposed foundations are vulnerable as well. But
even if readers are not inclined to doubt the enumeration
principle more broadly, constitutional lawyers should not go
around saying that the Vesting Clause establishes that principle.
Because it does not.
In Part I of this Article, I expose problems with the
enumerationist reading of Article I’s Vesting Clause. Then, in
Parts II and III, I offer better ways of understanding that Clause.
In Part II, I show that if the nonparallel phrasing of the
Constitution’s three Vesting Clauses is to be given substantive
legal significance, it makes more sense to read Article I’s Vesting
Clause as a statement that legislative power is vested solely in
Congress than as a statement that Congress is limited to powers
specifically enumerated. In Part III, I suggest that a yet better way
to read the three Vesting Clauses is to accept that their
nonparallel phrasing might not have any legal significance.
Two preliminary points are in order before proceeding
further. First, the contrast between the language of Article I’s
Vesting Clause and that of Article II is commonly offered in
support of two different propositions. One is that Congress can
act only on the basis of specifically enumerated powers. The other
is that the President, whose Vesting Clause does not speak of
powers “herein granted,” enjoys general executive power rather
than just a collection of specific textual authorizations.15 My focus
(2017) (explaining that Chief Justice John Marshall’s dictum in Gibbons v. Ogden that
“[t]he enumeration presupposed something not enumerated” was not an endorsement of
the enumeration principle); Richard Primus, “The Essential Characteristic”: Enumerated
Powers and the Bank of the United States, 117 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2018) (showing the
contested status of the enumeration principle at the time of the First Congress); Richard
Primus & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated Powers: A Guide to
Leaving the Lamppost, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming) (explaining why it does not make
sense to think that Article I’s enumeration of congressional powers is a device for limiting
federal legislative jurisdiction).
15. This view can encompass both what Julian Davis Mortenson calls the “law
execution” theory of Article II, Section 1 (according to which the Article II Vesting Clause
confers a general but substantive power to execute the law) and what Mortenson calls the
“royal residuum” theory (according to which the Article II Vesting Clause confers a set of
substantive powers once associated with the British Monarch, including such foreign
affairs and war powers as are not expressly allocated to Congress). See Julian Davis
Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM.
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in this Article is on the first of those propositions. But if I am right
that Article I’s Vesting Clause does not indicate that Congress is
limited to a set of textually enumerated powers, then the contrast
between the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and II does not support
the claim that Article II vests general executive power in the
President either. It might still be the case that the President should
be understood to enjoy general executive power, but the
contrasting language of the Vesting Clauses would not be a reason
why.16
Second, the prominence of arguments based on the nonparallel phrasing of the Vesting Clauses seems to be a relatively
recent phenomenon, dating more or less from the 1990s. Not that
such arguments were completely novel at that time: as scholars of
presidential power know, Alexander Hamilton used the contrast
to defend President Washington’s 1793 neutrality proclamation
against the charge that the President had only those powers
specifically enumerated in the Constitution.17 But Hamilton’s
argument seems to have been the product of post-ratification
creativity, rather than the articulation of a generally shared
understanding. As I will show below, the idea that Article I’s
Vesting Clause limits Congress to a set of textually enumerated
powers was virtually unknown in the ratification debates of 1787–
88.18 It was also absent from the First Congress, and conspicuously
so. The First Congress prominently featured conflict over the
question of whether Congress was limited to powers specifically
enumerated in the Constitution: think, for example, of the fight
over chartering the Bank of the United States. The
Representatives arguing for the enumerationist position in those
debates had every incentive to point to the Vesting Clauses for
support, if they thought the Vesting Clauses supported their view.
None of them did, which suggests that none of them thought
Article I’s Vesting Clause established the enumeration principle.19
So Hamilton’s 1793 argument indicates that it was possible for a
smart lawyer in the Early Republic to hit upon this reading, but it
L. REV. 1169, 1180–83 (2019).
16. For further discussion of the Article II issue, see Julian Davis Mortenson, The
Executive Power Clause, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1269 (2020).
17. See Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 33–43 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969); see infra Part
I.A.
18. See infra Part I.A.4.
19. See infra Part I.A.4.
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does not seem to have been an intuitive reading for the rest of the
Founding generation.
Nor did American lawyers make contrasting the Vesting
Clauses into a staple feature of constitutional argument after
Hamilton showed them the way. A generation after Hamilton,
Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States devoted roughly three thousand words to a chapter
on Article I’s Vesting Clause and at no point even hinted at the
possibility that its text might bear on the scope of the powers
vested in Congress,20 and his discussions of the other Vesting
Clauses include no mention of their being differently phrased.21 I
am aware of only one case in the Constitution’s first two centuries
in which a federal court read Article I’s Vesting Clause to support
the idea that Congress can exercise only a set of textually
enumerated powers.22 And in the law-review literature, it is hard
to locate arguments from the non-parallel phrasing of the Vesting
Clauses prior to the 1990s.23 None of this means that the idea was
ever wholly forgotten or affirmatively rejected.24 But it does not
20. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 269–88, at 199–209 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. abr. ed., 1833). For Story, the
thing worth discussing about the Vesting Clause was the bicameral nature of Congress. Id.
21. Id. §§ 720–65, at 515–45 (discussing Article II, Section 1); id. § 823, at 585, § 826,
at 587–89 (discussing Article III, Section 1).
22. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 81 (1907). Similarly, I am aware of only two
cases in which federal courts have read the contrast between the first two Vesting Clauses
to support Hamilton’s reading of Article II. They are Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
137–39 (1926) (citing Hamilton on executive power) and Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697,
704 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). To be clear, these are not the only two
instances in which federal courts have grappled with the possibility that the Vesting Clause
of Article II is a substantive grant of general executive power. They are merely the only
occasions (to my knowledge) on which the contrast between the language of Article II’s
Vesting Clause and that of Article I has been presented as a reason to interpret either
Vesting Clause in a particular way.
23. A 1988 article by David Currie seems to countenance the argument, but only in
passing and in a footnote. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
1946–1953, 37 EMORY L.J. 249, 289 n.240 (1988) (citing Hamilton).
24. Clinton Rossiter’s 1961 edition of the Federalist Papers is probably best read to
suggest an endorsement of the enumerationist reading of Article I’s Vesting Clause, but it
takes a bit of digging to see it. Rossiter printed the text of the Constitution at the back of
his book. Next to the Constitution’s text, he included, as a sort of index, the page number
or numbers of the book on which Publius discussed the relevant constitutional language.
Using this system, Rossiter indexed the words “All legislative Powers herein granted” to
the portion of Federalist 45 where Madison described the powers of the national
government as “few and defined.” See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 529 (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961). It seems fair to infer that Rossiter took the language of Article I, Section 1 to
establish that Congress could exercise only a small number of specifically enumerated
powers. But what the casual reader of Rossiter’s index might not notice is that Federalist
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seem to have been commonly held either.
Things seem to have changed at roughly the same time that
the Rehnquist Court was handing down landmark decisions like
New York v. United States25 and United States v. Lopez.26 In 1994,
in a Harvard Law Review article characterizing the entire modern
administrative state as unconstitutional, Gary Lawson read the
“herein granted” language of Article I, Section 1 to establish the
enumerationist interpretation of that Vesting Clause.27 The
following April, Laurence Tribe offered the enumerationist
reading in another Harvard Law Review article,28 and Justice
Clarence Thomas made the same move in his Lopez
concurrence.29 Many others have adopted that reading in the
quarter century since.30
But it was not always thus. For most of American history, the
language of Article I’s Vesting Clause was not standardly given
the enumerationist reading. Nor should it have been. The idea
that Article I’s Vesting Clause restricts Congress to a set of
45 nowhere quotes or mentions Article I, Section 1. (None of the Federalist Papers does.)
The association between that Clause and the idea of a Congress whose powers are “few
and defined” seems to be Rossiter’s rather than Madison’s.
25. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot commandeer state
legislatures).
26. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding, for the first time since 1937, that a piece of federal
legislation exceeded Congress’s legislative powers).
27. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1233–34 (1994). Lawson’s article was published shortly after a set of authors
endorsing robust presidential power revived Hamilton’s 1793 point and adduced the
contrast between the first two Vesting Clauses as evidence for their approach to Article II.
See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1175–76 (1992); Saikrishna Bangalore
Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President’s
Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 997 (1993).
28. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on FreeForm Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1269 (1995).
29. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 592 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas
has repeated the move more than once since Lopez, but always in separate opinions. See
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2097–98 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Comstock, 560
U.S. 126, 160 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
30. See supra note 6. In caselaw rather than academic commentary, I am aware of
only a few decisions clearly endorsing the enumerationist reading of Article I’s Vesting
Clause. See United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 596 (5th Cir. 2002): United States v.
Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Ho); United States v. Volungus, 599 F.
Supp. 2d 68, 71 n.2 (D. Mass. 2009) (citing TRIBE, supra note 6), rev’d, 595 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2010). As noted above, Justice Thomas has offered the enumerationist reading in several
separate opinions, but to my knowledge no Supreme Court majority has endorsed that
interpretation since Kansas v. Colorado in 1907.
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textually enumerated powers cannot withstand careful scrutiny.
I. THE ENUMERATIONIST READING
According to the enumerationist reading of the Vesting
Clause, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States” means that Congress can exercise
only a specific subset of all legislative powers—those “herein
granted”—rather than legislative power in general. In this Part, I
show that this reading departs from the most straightforward
meaning of the Clause’s language and is in tension with the
prevailing Founding understanding of constitutional structure.
Prior to Hamilton’s innovative argument in 1793, the idea that
Article I’s Vesting Clause limited Congress to a set of textually
enumerated powers was essentially unknown. In other words,
Americans at the time of the Constitution’s ratification do not
seem to have thought that Article I’s Vesting Clause had the
distinctive meaning that the enumerationist reading gives it, and
for good reason.
A. PROBLEMS
1. All and Only
The threshold problem with the enumerationist reading is a
matter of the ordinary-language meaning of the Vesting Clause’s
text. The enumerationist reading proceeds as if the Vesting
Clause said “Only the legislative powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States.” If the Clause were
worded that way, then it would indeed say, at least as a matter of
ordinary language, that Congress can exercise no legislative
powers except those granted “herein.” But the word “only” does
not appear in the Vesting Clause. Article I, Section 1 says that
“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States[.]” Not “only.”
If the terms “all” and “only” are given their normal
meanings, granting an institution all powers of a certain kind is
not the same as granting it only those powers. Consider some
ordinary-language analogies. “All men are mortal” does not mean
that only men are mortal. More prosaically, if only my green socks
are in the laundry, then my blue socks are not in the laundry. But
if all my green socks are in the laundry, some of my blue socks
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might be there too. To come closer to the point, “All Bills for
raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives”31 does not mean that the House is powerless to
originate other kinds of bills. By the same token, Congress can be
invested with all legislative powers of a given kind—those “herein
granted”—and also be invested with other legislative powers.32
One should not overstate this point. The fact that the
ordinary-language meanings of “all” and “only” function as
described above does not mean that no text could use the word
“all” to convey the restrictive meaning that “only” usually
conveys. Language is more complicated than that. The meaning
of a text is often different from the sum of the (literal, generally
prevailing) meanings of the words it contains, taken one by one.
And it is possible to identify uses of “all” and “only” that do not
conform to the pattern I illustrated above. The phrase “all right”
does not reliably signal that everything is as it should be, and E. M.
Forster’s injunction “Only connect!”33 did not mean that
connecting was the sole thing that people ought to do. So it is not
impossible that a text using the word “all” could be properly read
to mean the same thing that it would mean if the word “only” were
used instead, if circumstances of context and audience
understanding conspired to that end. And for many supporters of
the enumerationist reading, the contrasting wording of the
Constitution’s three Vesting Clauses is just such a circumstance.
But an argument that a constitutional clause should be given
a non-ordinary-language meaning should acknowledge the gap
between the proffered meaning and the one that ordinary
language would produce. The audience for the argument can then
assess whether the reasons given in favor of the proffered
meaning are strong enough to overcome whatever presumption
exists in favor of ordinary language. And as it happens,
proponents of the enumerationist reading of Article I’s Vesting
Clause do not usually argue that the Vesting Clause establishes
the enumeration principle even though the most straightforward
reading of its text says something else. On the contrary, they seem
not to notice that the Clause has an ordinary-language meaning
different from the one they favor. Some leading proponents of the
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
32. See John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment,
Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063, 1081 (2015).
33. E.M. FORSTER, HOWARDS END 188 (1910).
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enumerationist reading even contend that the enumeration
principle simply follows from the text of the Vesting Clause: in
Lessig’s formulation, that the text of the Clause makes the
principle “explicitly clear.”34 Needless to say, it doesn’t. As a
matter of ordinary language, the text of the Clause does not
establish the enumeration principle. It doesn’t even suggest it.
To be sure, the Vesting Clause does not establish that
Congress has powers beyond those specifically enumerated.
Taken in isolation, an ordinary-language understanding of the
text is consistent with Congress’s having “all legislative powers
herein granted” as well as some other powers, and it is also
consistent with Congress’s having “all legislative powers herein
granted” but none others. That the text is consistent with either
possibility is precisely the point. Despite the widespread
acceptance of the enumerationist reading, the text of Section 1
does not say that Congress is limited to powers “herein granted.”
The possibility of limitation is not addressed at all.
2. Where is “Herein”?
So far, the analysis has assumed, as the enumerationist
reading does, that “herein granted” in Article I means “granted
in this document.” But it is worth pausing for a moment to note
two other possibilities. The first is that “herein granted” means
“granted in this Article,” not “granted in this document.” The
second is that “herein granted” means—or at least meant, in
1787—not “granted in this document” but “granted in this system
of government.” If either of those alternatives is correct, the
enumerationist reading cannot be right.
Consider first the possibility that “herein granted” means
“granted in Article I.” As a matter of textual interpretation, there
is no reason why reading the language that way is less compelling
than reading it to mean “granted anywhere in this document.”
“Herein” lacks resolving power as between those options. The
word appears at the very beginning of Article I, which is a natural
place for a statement about things that will happen in Article I
particularly. On the other side of the question, one might argue
that the text also appears at the beginning of the whole document,
which is a natural place for a statement about things that will
happen in the whole document. But that response is less than
34. See LESSIG, supra notes 6 and 8 and accompanying text.
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clean, because Article I’s Vesting Clause does not, in fact, appear
at the beginning of the whole document. The Preamble does. The
language of the Preamble is reasonably understood as intended to
give the reader a frame for understanding the entire document in
a way that the language in a particular Article—even Article I,
Section 1—might not.
I do not think that this Preamble problem, or anything else,
dispositively proves that “herein granted” must mean “granted in
Article I” rather than “granted in this document as a whole.”35 But
“granted in Article I” is certainly a plausible reading—perhaps
even a marginally more plausible one, considered solely as a
textual matter. So without purporting to have shown that
“granted in this document as a whole” is an incorrect reading, I
suggest that the existence of this alternative should at least create
uncertainty.
The significance of that uncertainty is straightforward. If “All
legislative Powers herein granted” means “All legislative powers
granted in Article I,” then the Vesting Clause would not bespeak
a limitation on the legislative powers of Congress, even if “all”
were read to mean “only.” Congress obviously has legislative
powers granted outside of Article I. Consider the power to
declare the punishment of treason, which is granted in Article
III,36 or the power to legislate for the federal territories, which is
granted in Article IV,37 not to mention all the powers granted in
the enforcement clauses of later constitutional Amendments.38 So
if “All legislative Powers herein granted” means “All legislative
powers granted in Article I,” the Vesting Clause cannot mean
“Congress is vested with the powers herein granted and no
others.”
For some readers, that consequence will simply be a reason
to reject the possibility that “herein granted” means “granted in
Article I.” The more confident one is that the enumerationist
reading is correct, the more it will make intuitive sense to give the
words of the Vesting Clause a meaning that will support that
reading, rather than one that will undermine it. But note that what
35. A third possibility—that it means “granted in this Section”—can be safely
rejected on the grounds that the text of the Section in question specifies no particular
powers of Congress.
36. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
37. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
38. See, e.g., id. amend. XVI (power to levy income taxes).
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is doing the work when such a reader rejects the possibility that
“herein” means “in Article I” is not the text of the Clause. It is a
preexisting conviction about what the Clause must mean. If,
instead, one asked what the Clause might mean by consulting its
text, the correctness of the enumerationist reading would not be
at all clear.
Next, consider a different kind of alternative—one that rests
not on the common-sense meaning of the words of the Clause to
a twenty-first-century reader but on a feature of American
constitutional thought in 1787–88. Then as now, the term
“constitution” might refer not to a specific document but to a
system of government, one within which a document like the one
we call “the Constitution” might or might not play a role.39 One
can accordingly speak of the “American constitution” as a mostly
stable but somewhat fluid system of institutions and practices and
documents and understandings, on the model of the British
constitution the Founders knew, rather than as a single specified
document.40 That much is well understood. Regardless of what
legal consequences they think might or might not follow from the
conceptual point, many modern constitutional theorists are
comfortable talking about these two kinds of constitutions—
sometimes called the big-C Constitution, meaning the document
with the proper name, and the small-c constitution, which is the
broader system. But most of the time, theorists who speak of these
two C/constitutions see them as just that: two different entities,
each reflecting a different sense of the term that names them
both.41
That sense of a clear distinction between the document and
the system has not always been so solid. As Jonathan Gienapp has
explained at length, many Americans in 1787–88 drew no sharp
39. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1890); Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
1079 (2013); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). In saying that a
constitution can be a system of government, I do not mean to deny that things other than
governments also have constitutions, in the relevant sense of the term. But the present
discussion is about the governmental kind.
40. See, e.g., K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1934).
41. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1984) (arguing for the importance of distinguishing between those portions of
constitutional law that are textual and those that are not); Ernest A. Young, The
Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007) (recognizing both kinds
and sharply distinguishing between the two).
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distinction between the document and the constitution’s other
components.42 All of it—the document, the traditional practices,
the background assumptions and shared understandings—was
just “the constitution.” In Gienapp’s telling, the idea of the
written Constitution as a more fully differentiated entity—not
necessarily the exclusive source of constitutional authority, but at
least a distinct unit of analysis—gained prominence in the 1790s.43
But in 1787–88, it was not the prevailing conception. (The modern
convention of using “Constitution” to refer to the document and
“constitution” to refer to the broader system was accordingly not
in use at the Founding, not only because eighteenth-century
capitalization conventions were different, but also because
Americans then might have felt less need for a way to make the
distinction.)
So when the Framers wrote in the Preamble that they were
ordaining and establishing “this Constitution,” Gienapp suggests,
they meant to be ordaining and establishing something broader
than the document in which those words appeared. They meant
that they were ordaining and establishing a constitution in the
broader, more fluid, systemic sense.44 The promulgation of the
document was, within that way of thinking, an act announcing a
new constitution, but the constitution so announced was not
limited to the document. It was the broader thing. Just as Article
II or Article IV was not the entire constitution, neither was the
document as a whole.
For the purposes of the present inquiry into the Vesting
Clause, the significance of Gienapp’s point is that the Framers
might have understood “herein granted” to mean “granted in this
constitutional system,” not “granted in this document.”45 The
domain of “herein,” after all, depends on the unit of analysis that
is used to delimit the scope of “here.” “Herein” in a document
organized like the Constitution is organized could mean “in this
Clause,” “in this Section,” “in the Article,” “in this document,”
and perhaps other things as well, with the best reading dependent
42. See JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018).
43. E.g., id. at 197–200, 330–32.
44. See Jonathan Gienapp, The Myth of the Constitutional Given: Enumeration and
National Power at the Founding, 69 AM. U. L. REV. F. 183 (2020); Jonathan Gienapp, The
Unfounded Originalist Constitution, 39 L. & HIST. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2021) (on file
with author).
45. See supra note 44.
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on the broader context. (We know that “herein” in Article I,
Section 1 does not mean “in this Section” not because the word
could not bear that meaning but because if it did, the “powers
herein granted” would be an empty set.) Gienapp’s analysis
indicates that the list of increasingly broad possible meanings of
“herein” does not end at “in this document,” because for the
Framers the document was not sharply differentiated from the
rest of the constitution.
Put differently: the reason why it is intuitive to modern
readers that “herein granted” means “granted in this document”
is that our intuitive answer to the question “Where do those words
appear?” is “in the Constitution,” by which we mean neither more
nor less than “in the document.” But an American in 1787–88 who
said “those words appear in the C/constitution” could easily have
meant that those words were part of the larger system. If the
document is not separate from the rest of the constitution, then it
is perfectly natural to think that when the document says any
particular thing, it need not be significant that it’s the document
talking. What’s talking is the constitution. And if the constitution
speaks of powers “herein granted,” it is speaking of powers
granted in the constitution, which is something broader than the
document.
Within the Founding-era conceptual scheme that Gienapp
identifies, the enumerationist reading of the Vesting Clause
makes little sense. After all, the enumerationist reading requires
the “legislative powers herein granted” to be limited to legislative
powers specified in the text. If the “legislative powers herein
granted” can include legislative powers that are vested in
Congress by virtue of nontextual aspects of the constitution—say,
by virtue of the sheer fact that Congress was the national
legislature46 or by virtue of the fact that no other institution within
the system could fulfill a needed function47—then the text of the
46. See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the
Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 100 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) (describing certain powers
as “resulting” to Congress in this way); 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1955 (1791) (statement of
Rep. Vining) (arguing that Congress could exercise certain powers simply by virtue of its
being the legislature of an independent nation); id. at 1905 (statement of Rep. Ames)
(same).
47. See, e.g., 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1955 (1791) (statement of Rep. Vining); id. at 1929
(statement of Rep. Smith). See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (“[I]t is
not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, ‘a power which must
belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government’ is not to be found.”
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Vesting Clause does not limit Congress to any set of textually
enumerated powers. That text could still indicate that Congress is
vested only with those powers resulting to it from some specific
feature of the constitutional system, of course—or at least, it could
so indicate if “all” were read to mean “only,” in the way described
above. But the core claim of the enumerationist reading is that
Congress is restricted to powers affirmatively specified in the
written Constitution. If “herein granted” means something
broader than “granted in this document,” that reading falls apart.
3. Congress Might Have Nonlegislative Powers
The foregoing difficulties with the enumerationist reading
are matters of close textual reading. Next, consider an important
problem that is a matter of constitutional structure. The problem,
in short, is that the enumerationist reading only makes sense if all
of Congress’s powers are legislative. The point of the
enumerationist reading, after all, is to establish that Congress can
only do things that the text specifies. It reads the Vesting Clause
to limit Congress’s “legislative powers” to a certain set, and it
makes the assumption that limiting Congress’s legislative powers
is the same thing as limiting Congress. But if Congress has
nonlegislative powers as well as legislative ones, then a principle
limiting Congress’s legislative powers would not function as a
general limit on congressional power. Congress could still have
other powers, including powers not textually enumerated, so long
as those powers are not legislative powers.
Modern readers tend to overlook this possibility. The
dominant tendency today is to regard the powers exercised by
Congress—which we call “the legislative branch”—as “legislative
powers,” and the powers exercised by the President as “executive
powers,” and the powers exercised by the courts as “judicial
powers.” But that way of thinking flattens out what is better
understood as—and what the Founders clearly understood as—a
more complex system.48

(quoting Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903))).
48. On Founding-era recognition of this complexity, see, e.g., PAULINE MAIER,
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 57, 151, 286, 365
(2010). See also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 554 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of
Rep. Jackson) (“Are the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers kept separate and
distinct [under the new Constitution]? No, Mr. Chairman, they are blended; not, to be sure,
in so high or dangerous a degree, but in all the possible forms they are capable of receiving;
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The power to impeach and remove government officers, for
example, is not legislative in any substantive sense, even if
undertaken by a body that we think of as the “legislature.” The
impeachment process is a matter of prosecuting and adjudicating
the case of a single individual—that is, an exercise of powers that
are executive and judicial in nature—rather than a process of
lawmaking.49 The Senate’s role in the appointment process is also
not a lawmaking role.50 Congress’s power to lay taxes51 seems
unproblematically legislative, but its textually specified power to
collect taxes52 might be better understood as executive.53
Congress’s power to call conventions for considering
constitutional amendments on the application of the state
legislatures54 is at least as plausibly executive as legislative: the
decision to hold a convention belongs to the state legislatures, and
Congress is tasked merely with making it happen.
Given the malleability of the category, “legislative power,”
some of these characterizations are surely contestable.55 It is not
my view that any judgment about these contestable claims is as
good as any other. All things considered, I think the idea that all
the Executive has a qualified check upon the Legislature; the Legislature exercises the
powers of the Judiciary and Executive.”).
49. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463–64 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement
of Rep. Madison) (describing the Senate’s power to try impeachments as judicial).
50. See, e.g., Richard Henry Lee’s Proposed Amendments (Sept. 27, 1787), in 1 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 337, 338–39
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter 1 DHRC] (characterizing the Senate’s power of
appointments as executive); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 496 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)
(statement of Rep. Madison) (same).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
52. Id.
53. In 1783, when the Confederation Congress considered a report on the proposed
impost, some members of Congress argued that the word “levy” in the report should be
changed to “collect.” Their reason was “that the first word imported a legislative idea, &
the latter an executive only, and consequently the latter might be less obnoxious to the
States.” See 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 945–46
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922) [https://perma.cc/73R3-EV4W]. The motion to alter the wording
was defeated, but not on the ground that “levy” and “collect” lacked the different senses
that proponents of the change identified. Opponents of the change seem to have raised the
possibility that nothing would turn on the difference in wording but to have rested more
heavily on the view that the word choice was significant and that “levy” was the more
appropriate term. See id.
54. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
55. Indeed, as the discussion below highlights, the proposition “the Constitution
gives Congress non-legislative powers” depends on contestable claims about not just the
meaning of “legislative powers” but also about the meaning of “Congress.” (The same is
true for the proposition “the Constitution does not give Congress any non-legislative
powers.”).
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of Congress’s powers are legislative in nature is either hard to
sustain or else devoid of meaningful content. I recognize,
however, that my view rests in part on an exercise of judgment
and that some reasonable people will judge differently. As a
result, the conclusion to this piece of the analysis is perhaps best
stated in conditional form: if in the end it makes sense to say that
the Constitution confers at least one nonlegislative power on
Congress, then it cannot make sense to say that Congress can
exercise no powers except the “legislative powers herein
granted.” After all, it would then be the case that Congress is
entitled to exercise powers that are not legislative at all.
As a prescriptive matter, one might think that a system of
government ought to prevent any institution from exercising more
than one of these kinds of power. On the basis of examples
including some of those given above, many Antifederalists during
the ratification debates criticized the Constitution as violating the
separation-of-powers principle, because it jumbled powers and
branches rather than confining each branch of government (“the
legislature,” “the executive”) to the exercise of powers bearing
the cognate name (“legislative power,” “executive power”). For
example, Richard Henry Lee argued in September 1787 that the
proposed Constitution improperly vested an executive power in
the legislative branch by authorizing the Senate to confirm
presidential appointments.56 Responding to such criticisms,
Madison argued that a judicious mixture of the powers was
consistent with the separation-of-powers idea, which at bottom
required not that an institution could never be vested with more
than one kind of power but that each branch should have the
ability to check and balance the others.57 But the fact that the
56. See 1 DHRC, supra note 50, at 338. Lee proposed to solve this problem by
assigning the confirmation power to a privy council lodged entirely within the executive
branch. Id. For other examples, see MAIER, supra note 48, at 151, 286.
57. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“One of the principal
objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution, is its
supposed violation of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments ought to be separate and distinct. . . . I persuade myself, however, that it will
be made apparent to every one. that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim
on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. . . . [The true principle is
not] that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts
of each other. . . . [But] that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constitution are subverted. . . . This, however, is not among the vices of
that constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of
himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in
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Constitution did not maintain a strict one-to-one pairing of
institutions with types of power was common ground between the
Constitution’s defenders and its detractors. What they disputed
was whether the mixture was vice or virtue. And if the
Constitution vests Congress with nonlegislative powers, then it
cannot be true that Congress’s only powers are the “legislative
powers herein granted.”
To be sure, someone willing to read “all” to mean “only”
could argue that the Vesting Clause limits Congress to the
legislative powers herein granted where the exercise of legislative
power is concerned. In other words, even if Congress can exercise
some legislative powers and also some nonlegislative ones, it
might be the case that the legislative powers Congress can exercise
are only the ones “herein granted.” Again, this position would
require reading the Clause as if it said “only” rather than “all.”
But perhaps as great a problem for someone tempted by this
argument is that it abandons the proposition that Congress is
limited to a set of textually enumerated powers. If the Vesting
Clause limits only the subset of congressional powers deemed
“legislative,” then Congress can exercise powers beyond those
“herein granted” so long as those powers are denominated
executive, judicial, or anything else other than legislative, whether
on prevailing modern conceptions or within the eighteenthcentury schemes the Founders knew. A lot of power lies down
that road, including a lot of power going beyond anything
specified in the text of the Constitution. So if the ultimate aim is
to support the view that Congress can exercise only a set of
textually enumerated powers, this refinement will be of no help.
A different response in defense of the enumerationist
reading might maintain that, although the Constitution blends
forms of power within particular institutions, no part of the mixand-match arrangement vests a nonlegislative power in Congress.
One critical element of this rejoinder is a distinction between
powers vested in Congress and powers vested in the Senate or in
the House of Representatives. On this view, the power to confirm
appointments is a power of the Senate,58 not a power of Congress
as a whole. Similarly, the text of the Constitution does not say that
“Congress” has the power to impeach and remove government

person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it.”).
58. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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officers. It says that the House of Representatives has the power
of impeachment59 and that the Senate has the power to try
impeachments.60 The House alone is not “Congress,” and neither
is the Senate. So if impeachment and trial are two separate
powers, one vested in the House and one in the Senate, then it is
plausible to say that neither of these nonlegislative powers is
vested in Congress as such.
How persuasive this rejoinder seems is partly a matter of
one’s relative tastes for formal and substantive reasoning.
Substantively, nothing that either House does in an impeachment
process has legal consequences without the action of the other,
such that the power to remove an officer is held only by the two
branches acting together—that is, by Congress. Formally,
however, the text of the Constitution speaks of impeachment and
trial as two powers vested in two separate bodies, neither of which
is “Congress.” Indeed, someone inclined to read the Constitution
as vesting only legislative powers in Congress might argue that the
vesting of these three nonlegislative powers (confirmation,
impeachment, and trial) in one House or the other rather than in
Congress as a whole testifies to the Constitution’s general
commitment to restrict Congress as such to a single sort of power:
the legislative sort.
I am not aware that anyone at the Founding offered the
distinction between Congress and its separate chambers in order
to establish that the Constitution vested no nonlegislative powers
in Congress. But for modern readers motivated to defend that
position, the distinction may be cogent enough to be serviceable
even if nobody at the Founding thought in those terms. Moreover,
readers motivated to defend that position are also likely, and in
good faith, to be able to solve other problems that distinguishing
between Congress and its component Houses might seem to
threaten. For example, the power to originate bills for raising
revenue is vested in the House of Representatives alone.61 So if
the idea that Congress possesses only “legislative powers”
requires the premise that a power vested in one House is not a
power vested in Congress, and if it is also the case (as the plain
59. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment.”).
60. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments.”).
61. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.

PRIMUS 35:3

320

12/29/2020 11:18 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 35:301

text of Article I, Section 1 provides) that all legislative powers are
vested in Congress, then it must be the case that the power to
originate bills is not a legislative power. Absent the stakes of this
interpretive question, that proposition might be a tough sell. But
if one finds it appealing (or imperative) to conclude that Congress
exercises only legislative powers, and one recognizes that
defending that conclusion requires classifying the power to
originate revenue bills as nonlegislative, it will not be difficult to
come up (in good faith) with arguments characterizing the power
to originate bills as nonlegislative. For example, one might argue
that “legislative power” is exercised only when a bill is approved
and not at any earlier point in the process.
But that possibility raises this further puzzle: approved by
whom? Presumably the answer is “approved by the body with the
power to make the bill a law.” That answer need not imply that
Presidents exercise legislative power when signing bills, because
congressional approval is sufficient to make a bill a law even if the
President does nothing.62 But it does seem to indicate that
Congress does not exercise legislative power when, acting under
Article V, it votes to propose constitutional amendments, because
proposed amendments do not have the force of law until ratified
by state legislatures. The problem, then, is that if the origination
of a bill by the House is not legislative because it is insufficient to
give the bill the force of law, the proposal of an amendment is also
not legislative. And the proposal of amendments is a power vested
in Congress as such.63
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the contention that
the Constitution vests no nonlegislative powers in Congress is

62. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3.
63. One could also deny that the authority to originate bills for raising revenue and
the authority to propose constitutional amendments to the states are legislative powers on
the grounds that they are not “powers” at all, because the Constitution does not use that
word when describing those processes. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising Revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives[.]”); id. art. V (“The Congress, whenever
two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this
Constitution . . . which . . . shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States[.]”).
One’s sense of the strength of that argument may depend on one’s taste for formal as
opposed to substantive reasoning. But if one accepts this argument, it would seem to follow
that even if Congress were limited to “powers herein granted,” that limitation would not
prevent Congress from possessing the capacity to do many things not lying within those
powers, so long as those capacities were not called “powers.” The enumerationist reading
aims at something more substantively constraining than that.
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partly enabled by the fact that the categories “legislative,”
“executive,” and “judicial” are malleable.64 Consider again
Congress’s power to call conventions for proposing constitutional
amendments on the application of the state legislatures.65 If we
are disposed to think of all congressional action as “legislative,” it
will not be hard to think of Congress’s calling such a convention
as a legislative action. Calling a convention is prospective, and it
has a policymaking aspect, and it would likely create rules for
many people to follow, perhaps by determining the process for
selecting delegates or the convention’s rules of procedure. But it
is also easy to see calling such a convention as an executive action.
It is the states and not Congress who possess the authority to
make the substantive decision about whether to hold a
convention.66 Congress’s role is limited to putting that choice into
practice. To be sure, Congress in calling such a convention could
exercise considerable discretion, for example, in setting the time
and place of the convention and perhaps in crafting its rules of
procedure or even providing for the method by which delegates
would be chosen. Through those decisions, Congress could
exercise substantive influence on the convention it was calling.
But such discretion and influence are common in many activities
that the American system routinely considers “executive.”67 So if
we see the Constitution as containing a fair amount of mixing and
matching with respect to powers and branches, as many in the
64. As are other categories that might be deployed to describe kinds of governmental
power. For example, Americans who followed Locke’s analysis would have deemed
several congressional powers “federative” rather than “legislative.” See JOHN LOCKE,
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, §§ 146–48, at 76–77 (C. B. Macpherson ed., 1980)
(1690). According to one recent Supreme Court opinion, Locke’s approach to the
separation of powers was particularly influential among the Founders. See Gundy v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133–34 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). If so, and if as a
result the Founders would have understood several congressional powers as “federative”
rather than legislative, then at least those Founders would have been unlikely to think that
Congress was limited to “legislative powers herein granted.” There is good reason to think,
however, that Locke’s view of the separation of powers was not influential in the American
Constitution-making process. See, e.g., 1 THE RECEPTION OF LOCKE’S POLITICS, at l–liii
(Mark Goldie ed., 1999); John Dunn, The Politics of Locke in England and America in the
Eighteenth Century, in JOHN LOCKE: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 45, 45–80 (John W.
Yolton ed., 1969).
65. See U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress . . . on the Application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments[.]”).
66. See id. (“The Congress . . . on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of
the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments[.]”) (emphasis
added).
67. Think of the discretion exercised by prosecutors, or by the President as
Commander-in-Chief.
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Founding generation did, then it is easy to see the power to call
conventions on the application of state legislatures as executive.
And if Congress is vested with an executive power, then the
proposition that Congress is vested only with the “legislative
powers herein granted” cannot be correct.68
Perceptive observers have long understood that the
classification of a given power as “legislative,” “executive,” or
“judicial” is often contestable,69 and sometimes the wisest
conclusion is that a given power does not fall inherently and
exclusively into a single one of those categories.70 Different
readers may thus have different intuitions about whether the
Constitution’s blending of powers and branches undermines the
enumerationist reading of Article I’s Vesting Clause. A
reasonable person could conclude that the Constitution (on either
a Founding-era reckoning or a modern one) does not clearly vest
“executive,” “judicial,” or other “nonlegislative” powers in
“Congress” as such. Alternatively, a reasonable person could
conclude that the Constitution does that very thing, whether with
respect to impeachment or appointments or calling conventions
or otherwise.71 So in the end, the most responsible thing that can
68. One might resist the conclusion that the power to call conventions is an executive
power vested in Congress by denying that Congress’s calling a convention is an exercise of
a power at all: Article V says that Congress “shall call a convention,” not that Congress
has the power to call a convention. Again, this move rests a great deal on terminology, and
again it raises the problem that on its terms, even if Congress were limited to the “powers
herein granted,” it might have untold abilities to do other things, so long as the capacity to
do those things was called something other than “powers.”
69. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison).
70. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (reaching this
conclusion with respect to the treaty power).
71. Based on his reading of Blackstone, William Winslow Crosskey concluded that
as many as thirteen of the powers that Article I assigned to Congress were powers held by
the King within the British constitutional system and would have been considered
“executive” rather than legislative in nature. See 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 411–14
(1953); see also MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (endorsing this position). These included
the powers to coin money, to declare war, to issue letters of marque and reprisal, to raise
and regulate fleets and armies, to naturalize foreigners, to be the “arbiter of commerce,”
and to regulate weights and measures. See CROSSKEY, id. at 412–14. That view likely
overstates the degree to which the Founders thought the Constitution assigned executive
powers to Congress: Julian Mortenson cautions that, within the then-prevailing
understanding of British constitutional law, powers could be formally vested in the King
without being “executive powers” in any substantive sense. See Mortenson, supra note 15.
It is not my purpose here to adjudicate this dispute. But I will point out, on Mortenson’s
side of the question, that Americans in the 1780s who criticized the Constitution for vesting
executive power in the legislative branch did not, so far as I am aware, point as examples
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be said on this matter is conditional: if the category “legislative
powers” does not exhaust the category “congressional powers,” it
would make little sense to think that Article I opens with a
declaration that a particular subset of legislative powers—that is,
the “legislative powers herein granted”—were the only powers
that Congress could exercise. Indeed, if the Founders generally
understood the Constitution to vest both legislative and
nonlegislative powers in Congress, then reading the Vesting
Clause as if it said that Congress could exercise only the legislative
powers herein granted would not just be to read the Clause to
mean something that the language does not say. It would be to
read the Clause to mean something that its language does not say
in order to make the Clause say something that the Founders, or
many of them, would have regarded as false.
4. Original Usage: The Inference from Silence
Another piece of Founding-era evidence is considerably less
ambiguous. As far as can be determined, the enumerationist
reading of the Vesting Clause was virtually unknown at the
Founding. It was not, to be sure, completely unavailable. A great
many people made a great many arguments about the
Constitution in 1787–88, and, as in any sprawling conversation, a
wide variety of ideas was on offer—some of them more tenable
than others. But as far as I can tell, the surviving records reveal
only two instances during the ratification period when anyone
read Article I, Section 1 to mean that Congress could exercise
only powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution’s text.72
A delegate named Stephen Chambers read the clause that way at
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,73 and so did the
to most of the powers on Crosskey’s list of thirteen. It is also worth noting that any
conclusion about how many non-executive powers the Constitution vested in Congress
requires not just judgments about what counts as a nonlegislative power but also about
what counts as “one power.” (How many powers are articulated in Article I, Section 8,
clause 1?) For present purposes, however, nothing substantive depends on how many
nonlegislative powers the Founders thought the Constitution assigned to Congress. All
that matters is whether the Founders, or many of them, regarded Congress as exercising at
least one power that was not “legislative” in nature.
72. This is my conclusion based on searching, inter alia, the DHRC database for the
term “herein granted” on May 31, 2019, and subsequently asking a research assistant to try
to falsify my conclusion using a variety of search strings.
73. The Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 1, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 444, 445 (Merrill Jensen ed.,
1976). Chambers, who was one of the original members of the Pennsylvania Society of the
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pseudonymous writer Cassius in the Massachusetts Gazette.74
Perhaps the argument was also made on other occasions: the
documentary record is imperfect, and I could have missed some
examples that the record does reflect. But regardless of whether
the idea was articulated on just two occasions or also on four or
five others, it would not have been more than marginal in the
continental conversation. Apparently, the enumerationist reading
was neither natural enough to be common nor persuasive enough
on the few occasions when it was articulated for others to pick it
up and make use of it.
It is hard to know just why Americans at the Founding did
not offer the enumerationist reading of the Vesting Clause. But
there is no shortage of possibilities, as the argument of this Article
to this point suggests. Maybe they did not think that “herein
granted” meant “granted in this document.” Or if they did think
the powers referred to were specified in the document, maybe
they took “herein granted” to mean “granted in Article I,” in
which case the Clause was obviously not limiting, given the
congressional powers specified in places like Article IV.75 Maybe
they understood that no limit on “legislative powers” could be a
limit on congressional power in general, because Congress had
nonegislative powers as well as legislative ones. Maybe they just
didn’t think that “all” meant “only.” But for whatever reasons,
and in whatever combinations, it seems clear that Americans at
the Founding did not understand the Vesting Clause in the way
the enumerationist reading does. Which should probably not be
surprising, given that reading’s several weaknesses.
The enumerationist reading’s near-total absence from the
Cincinnati, was an Irish-born lawyer who came to Pennsylvania before the Revolution. He
died in 1789 as a result of a duel fought for apparently non-political reasons. See William
Henry Egle, The Federal Constitution of 1787, 11 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY at 69, 69–
70 (1887).
74. Cassius VI, To the Inhabitants of this State, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 18, 1787,
reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 479, 482 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1998); Cassius VI,
To the Inhabitants of this State, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 25, 1787, supra, at 511, 511. Cassius
was probably James Sullivan, a justice of the highest court in Massachusetts from 1776 to
1782 and, in 1787, one of the lawyers who defended participants in Shays’s Rebellion, as
well as Governor of Massachusetts from 1807 to 1808. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 30 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare
J. Saladino eds., 1997); MAIER, supra note 48, at 193–94; CHARLES WARREN, 1 HISTORY
OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 188
(1908).
75. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (power to legislate for the territories).
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ratification process is particularly noteworthy because issues
about the extent of congressional power were central to the
debate. The Constitution’s opponents repeatedly charged that
Congress in the new system would be able to wield whatever
power it wanted.76 The Constitution’s defenders denied the charge
many times.77 If the very first words of Article I clearly stated that
Congress had less than general legislative authority, why did the
Constitution’s defenders not say so, loudly and often? Even if the
first words of Article I were just a plausible suggestion of the
point, rather than a clear statement of it, it would have been
natural for the Constitution’s defenders to invoke it in these
arguments. But they didn’t. In all of the Federalist Papers, for
example, thirty or so of which specifically addressed questions
about the extent of congressional power, Publius invoked the
Vesting Clause exactly zero times.
The evidence from the First Congress points in the same
direction.78 Questions about enumerated powers were central to,
and extensively debated in, both the removal debate of 178979 and
the debate on the bill to establish the Bank of the United States
in 1791.80 In the House of Representatives, each of those debates
lasted for several days, with prominent Founders laying out their
views about enumerated powers under the Constitution. On many
occasions, it would have been useful for some of them (including
Madison, both times) to be able to say that the text of the
Constitution restricted Congress to the exercise of enumerated
powers. In the removal debate, an argument that the Vesting
Clause of Article I is limiting in a way that the Vesting Clause of
Article II is not would have let Madison and his allies bolster their
contention that the Constitution vested the President with
executive power in general, rather than only with a specified list
of powers.81 But the distinctive text of Article I’s Vesting Clause
76. See, e.g., Brutus I, To the Citizens of the State of New York, N.Y.J., Oct. 18, 1787,
reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 411, 414 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981); Centinel II,
To the People of Pennsylvania, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Oct. 24, 1787, id. at 457, 460.
77. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 41, 45 (James Madison).
78. See generally JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (1999).
79. See GIENAPP, supra note 42, at 125–63.
80. See id. at 202–47.
81. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 495–97 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement
of Rep. Madison). The point can be further sharpened, because Madison in this debate
actually did invoke the Constitution’s three Vesting Clauses as part of his argument that
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played no role in the removal debate. So far as appears in the
records, nobody mentioned it at all.
The Bank debate is even more germane, because it focused
above all else on questions about the extent of congressional
power. Madison spoke repeatedly and at length, arguing not just
that Congress could exercise only its enumerated powers but also
that the principle of a limiting enumeration was fundamental to
the system.82 He needed to argue these points, because not
everyone agreed. Some of Madison’s opponents conceded that
Congress could exercise only its enumerated powers and
disagreed with Madison only on the question of whether the
enumerated powers authorized the Bank, but others denied the
basic premise that Congress could exercise only the powers that
the Constitution specifically enumerated.83 If any significant
number of members of the First Congress had thought that
Article I, Section 1 decided this issue in Madison’s favor,
someone—likely Madison—would have said so. But in the entire
debate, at no point did Madison or anyone else arguing for the
limitation of congressional power point to the language of the
Vesting Clause.
As far as I have been able to determine, the first prominent
endorsement of the enumerationist reading of the Vesting Clause
came two years after the Bank debate. As noted in the
Introduction to this Article, Hamilton in 1793 wrote a series of
essays contending that President Washington had unilateral
authority to proclaim America’s neutrality in the war between
Britain and France. Writing under the pseudonym “Pacificus,”
Hamilton developed several arguments. One was that issuing a
neutrality proclamation was an “executive act” and that the
Constitution vested the President with “the executive power”—
meaning, on Hamilton’s account, not just a set of specified powers
(to command the army and navy, to receive ambassadors, etc.) but
executive power in general.84 To support that claim, Hamilton
the Constitution manifests an intention to minimize the extent to which power of any given
kind (e.g., “legislative”) would be assigned to a branch not bearing the cognate description
(e.g., “the legislature”). Id. at 497. So the Vesting Clauses were plainly in view—and yet
neither Madison nor anyone else made use of the nonparallel phrasing of the Clauses, even
though it would have helped them to do so.
82. See, e.g., Primus, “The Essential Characteristic,” supra note 14.
83. See, e.g., id.
84. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 33–43 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969).
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contrasted the language of Article I’s Vesting Clause with that of
Article II. The difference between “All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested” and “The executive Power shall be
vested,” Hamilton contended, reflected the difference between
conferring a specific set of enumerated powers and conferring a
type of power categorically.85 This was, of course, exactly the
argument that would have helped Madison during the removal
debate four years earlier. But Madison did not come up with it.
And an argument that Madison could not come up with in 1789 is
unlikely to have been a straightforward Founding-era
understanding of the Constitution.
Hamilton’s use of the Vesting Clause argument in his
Pacificus essay is well known.86 For a modern audience, it likely
masks the fact that the argument was all but unheard of before
1793. When a lawyer knows that a constitutional interpretation
that is widely credited today was made by Hamilton, it is easy to
jump to the conclusion that it was a standard view at the
Founding—or at least a view known and taken seriously. But as
described above, the enumerationist reading of the Vesting
Clause was all but unknown during the ratification debates and in
the First Congress, despite the prominence during those times of
debates about the extent of congressional power. Against that
background, Hamilton’s articulation of the view in 1793 seems
like innovative lawyering by an attorney for the executive branch.
That doesn’t make it wrong. Reading creatively is part of
what good lawyers do. For present purposes, though, the point is
that Hamilton’s argument in 1793 required lawyerly creativity. He
was not simply producing the straightforward meaning of the text
in a way that his audience would recognize as familiar. Hamilton’s
arguing for this reading in 1793 thus does not establish that the
Framers or the ratifying public would have shared his view in
1787–88, and they do not seem to have done so. Nor is there any
indication that Hamilton himself had that view until the
assignment to justify Washington’s proclamation motivated him
to go looking for useful arguments.
Just as the innovative nature of Hamilton’s argument doesn’t
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2101 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (invoking
Hamilton’s Pacificus argument); Eric. A Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1675 n.26 (2002) (same).
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make that argument wrong, it also doesn’t make that argument
right. Of the many innovative arguments that creative lawyers
make, something less than a hundred percent turn out to be
sound. And when Hamilton did argue from an enumerationist
interpretation of the Vesting Clause, it is not clear that he thought
the matter all the way through. For example, Hamilton did not
explain why a text that says “All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States” should mean
“Only the legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States.” Or how a Constitution widely
understood to mix types of power across the branches could also
be a Constitution limiting Congress to legislative power alone.
B. CONFIRMATION BIAS
Hamilton’s failure to engage the problems with his reading
might not have been the product of deliberate evasion. It is
ordinary, in the process of creative lawyering, for an advocate to
find a text that looks supportive at first glance and run with it,
attending insufficiently to the weaknesses of his interpretation.
When we want a text to mean something, we sometimes read it to
mean that thing in perfectly good faith, even if a less motivated or
more critical reader could give good reasons why the text should
not be read that way.
The popularity of the enumerationist view of Article I’s
Vesting Clause among modern constitutional lawyers may be at
least partly explained in similar terms. Just as we tend to misread
texts to say what we want them to mean, we tend to misread texts
to say what we expect them to mean.87 Almost every constitutional
lawyer has a clear expectation that the Constitution will say that
Congress can exercise only its enumerated powers. Every law
student learns that principle. So there is a tendency to read the
text of the Constitution as if it confirmed the point. And sure
enough, two features of the Vesting Clause do correspond to
features of the idea that Congress can exercise only specifically
enumerated powers. First, the enumerated-powers idea indicates
that Congress exercises specific powers, plural, rather than
legislative power in general—and the Article I Vesting Clause,
unlike its Article II and III counterparts, speaks of “powers”
rather than “power.” Second, the enumerated-powers idea insists
87. See Richard Primus, Constitutional Expectations, 109 MICH. L. REV. 91 (2010).
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that Congress can do only things that are affirmatively specified
in the Constitution, and the language of “herein granted” might
reflect the idea of affirmative specification in the constitutional
text. For a reader who is primed to think that the Constitution
promulgates the enumeration principle, these features of the
Vesting Clause’s text might be enough to confirm the
presupposition. This is probably all the more so for readers who
take the enumeration principle to be, conceptually, the first
fundamental thing that one must know about the constitutional
powers of Congress. After all, the Vesting Clause isn’t just some
stray clause in Article I. It is the first thing the Constitution says
about Congress. What more appropriate way could there be for
the Constitution to begin its discussion of Congress than with a
statement of the essential and distinctive characteristic of
congressional power—that is, that it is confined to the powers
specifically enumerated?
The trouble with the thought process just described is that it
gives in too easily to confirmation bias. The reader already
believes that the Constitution permits Congress to authorize only
its specifically enumerated powers. The reader expects an
announcement of that principle when the subject of Congress is
introduced. The first Clause describing Congress has some textual
features that seem to distinguish Congress’s power from the
President’s and the judiciary’s, and it has some words that
resonate with the enumerated-powers idea. So the reader
concludes that the enumerated-powers idea is what animates the
language of the Clause. In so doing, the reader does not notice
that that the plain meaning of the text says something else. And
because the meaning the reader has attributed to the text is
satisfying, the question of whether Americans in 1787–88
understood (or could have understood) the text this way probably
does not arise.88 It is assumed—much as most modern lawyers
simply assume that the Founders understood “thirty-five years”
to mean what we mean by the same phrase. Except that the
assumption in the latter case is warranted.
Nothing I have argued above means that the enumeration
principle is wrong. Maybe that idea is correct, such that
constitutional lawyers are fully justified in approaching their work
on the understanding that Congress can exercise only its textually
88. “What satisfies the conscience lulls the mind.” Llewellyn, supra note 40, at 10.
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specified powers.89 But even if that were the case, it would not
follow that every clause of the Constitution should be read to
establish or confirm that rule. The clause providing that Senators
are elected every six years90 has no bearing on whether Congress
is limited to a set of enumerated powers. Neither does the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV91 or the Debts
Clause of Article VI.92 The point of the present analysis is that the
Vesting Clause of Article I does not bear on the question either.
That constitutional lawyers who expect the Constitution to
establish the enumeration principle would find it established by
the Vesting Clause is explicable, partly as a matter of
confirmation bias. But whether or not the enumeration principle
is a sound principle of constitutional law, the Vesting Clause does
not establish it.
C. THE ABSENCE OF ALTERNATIVES
One other factor may help support the enumerationist
reading of the Article I Vesting Clause: the absence of an
alternative. Given the conventions of constitutional
interpretation, the difference in syntax between the Vesting
Clause of Article I and the Vesting Clauses of Articles II and III
presents the conscientious interpreter with a question. Why is this
Vesting Clause different from those other Vesting Clauses? Once
the question is asked, the interpreter wants an answer. The
enumerationist reading offers one. So, if the enumerationist
answer is the only answer available, interpreters might gloss over
its shortcomings. The only available answer is, by definition, the
best available answer.
But the enumerationist answer is not the only way to explain
the distinctive syntax of Article I’s Vesting Clause. It is merely the
most familiar. In the next two sections, I describe two other
explanations, each of which is better than the enumerationist
answer. The first alternative answer operates at the level of plain
textual meaning: it makes sense of the difference in phrasing
between Article I, Section 1 and the other two Vesting Clauses on
a straightforward reading of the Constitution’s language. The
second alternative answer operates at the level of drafting history.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Again, I have my doubts. See supra note 14. But that isn’t the point right now.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
See id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
See id. art. VI, cl. 1.
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It suggests that the nonparallel wording of the three Vesting
Clauses is a contingent artifact of the Constitution’s drafting
process and reflects nothing substantive about congressional
power. Different readers may have different intuitions about the
relative attractiveness of these two explanations, but either one
should be enough to displace the enumerationist reading.
II. THE PLAIN-MEANING READING
In this Part, I describe a different way to read Article I’s
Vesting Clause. It is a plain-meaning reading—that is, a reading
that gives the words of the Clause their ordinary-language senses.
This way of reading the Clause has both strengths and
weaknesses. In the end, I suspect that the attractiveness of this
way of reading the Clause is partly a function of how committed
one is to the proposition that the difference in phrasing between
Article I’s Vesting Clause and that of the other two Vesting
Clauses must reflect something substantive in constitutional law.
For readers who are comfortable with the idea that the difference
in phrasing among the Vesting Clauses might have no substantive
significance, the plain-meaning reading (like the enumerationist
reading) might seem less than compelling. But if the difference in
phrasing must have substantive significance, then there is a strong
case for adopting the plain-meaning reading—a stronger case,
certainly, than the case for adopting the enumerationist reading.
A. WHAT THE WORDS SAY
Consider what the Vesting Clause would mean if its words
were given their ordinary sense. On a plain-meaning approach,
“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States” means, well, that all legislative
powers granted in the Constitution are vested in Congress. In
other words, if the Constitution grants a legislative power, the
body in which that power is vested is Congress.93 Not the
President, not the courts, not the states, not the people directly.
Just Congress.94
93. This formula works if “the Constitution” refers to a document, and it also works
if “the Constitution” refers to a system. In the latter case, the passage means that all
legislative powers granted by this system of government are vested in Congress. See supra
notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
94. This plain-meaning reading does not establish a strong form of the nondelegation
doctrine, because the fact that Congress is “vested” with a power need not mean that
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This plain-meaning reading supplies a straightforward
answer to the question of why Article I’s Vesting Clause differs in
syntax from the other two Vesting Clauses. From a Founding-era
perspective, if the Constitution vested all legislative power in a
single branch of the national government, then it treated
legislative power differently from executive power and judicial
power. As noted above, it was common ground within the
Founding generation that the national executive power was not
vested entirely in the President, nor the national judicial power
entirely in the courts. Examples included the House’s and
Senate’s executive and judicial powers in the impeachment
process95 and the Senate’s executive power in confirming
appointments.96 In the First Congress’s first serious encounter
with separation-of-powers issues—the removal debate of 1789—
Madison accordingly characterized the Vesting Clause of Article
II as a default rule that is sometimes overcome by specific
constitutional provisions varying the general pattern.97 In other
words, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President” did
not mean that all executive power would be vested in the
Congress is disabled from delegating that power to another decisionmaker. See Thomas
W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2097 (2004) (noting that the text of the Vesting Clause could
reflect either the position that Congress may not delegate legislative power or the position
that only Congress may delegate legislative power, and concluding overall that the latter
position is superior); Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the
Founding (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 658, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3512154 (adducing Founding-era support for the permissibility
of Congress’s delegating the exercise of its powers to other actors, provided that Congress
retained the authority to end the delegation and exercise the relevant power itself). In
delegation cases, the Supreme Court has associated Section 1 with the nondelegation
doctrine. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“Article I,
§ 1, of the Constitution vests ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of
the United States.’ This text permits no delegation of those powers[.]”). As Merrill’s
argument indicates, that association might be incorrect—and indeed one can read the
Supreme Court’s language in American Trucking as hedged on the point. “This text
permits no delegation” is, strictly speaking, consistent with “nor does it prohibit
delegation.” But whether or not Section 1 establishes a strong form of the nondelegation
doctrine, reading its text as a limitation of certain legislative powers to Congress alone is
more defensible, as a matter of plain meaning, than reading it as a limitation of Congress
to a specific set of enumerated powers.
95. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463–64 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement
of Rep. Madison) (describing the Senate’s power to try impeachments as judicial).
96. See, e.g., 1 DHRC, supra note 50 (characterizing the Senate’s power as
executive); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 496 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.
Madison) (same).
97. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 496 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.
Madison).
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President. It couldn’t mean that, because some executive power
was not vested in the President.98
On this understanding, the distinctive syntax of Article I’s
Vesting Clause simply reflects the fact that legislative power,
unlike executive and judicial power, was vested exclusively in a
single branch of the national government. The Constitution could
not say “All executive powers herein granted shall be vested in a
President” or “All judicial powers herein granted shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish,” because those
propositions would have been false. Some executive powers were
located outside the “executive branch,” and some judicial powers
were located beyond the “judicial branch.” But legislative powers
were not vested in any body other than Congress. So it was
appropriate for Article I’s Vesting Clause to say that “All
legislative powers herein granted” were vested in Congress.
This plain-meaning interpretation makes sense of the fact
that Article I’s Vesting Clause speaks of “All legislative powers”
while the other Vesting Clauses speak of “The executive power”
and “The judicial power.” But if the plain-meaning reading is to
be an attractive alternative to the enumerationist reading of the
Vesting Clause, it would benefit from also explaining something
else: why Article I’s Vesting Clause contains the words “herein
granted.” If the point of the Clause were to say that only Congress
was vested with legislative powers, Article I could have opened
with the words “All legislative powers shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States” rather than “All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”
But it is not hard to imagine rationales for the choice to
include the “herein granted” language that make sense within a
plain-meaning reading of the clause. One possibility,
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in 1792, is that the words
“herein granted” reflected the view that the power of establishing
(or disestablishing) the Constitution was itself legislative in

98. See also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 487 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of
Rep. Jackson) (explaining the President obviously does not have all of the executive power
under the Constitution). Yes, this means that Justice Scalia was wrong in his rhetorically
magnificent dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(insisting that the text of the Vesting Clause of Article II means that all executive power is
vested in the President) (It is perhaps worth remembering that Justice Scalia’s dissent
attracted only his own vote.).
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nature.99 That power was not vested in Congress; it belonged to
the people. So it would not be right to say, without qualification,
that “All legislative powers shall be vested in Congress.” Another
possibility is more practical: the statement “All legislative powers
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States” could have
been read (or misread) to mean that the state legislatures were
being stripped of their legislative powers. The drafters surely
wanted neither to convey that idea nor to invite that misreading.
Even if the Convention delegates had no intention of ending
state-level legislation, they would not have wanted to propose a
Constitution whose text would require them to explain that point.
“All legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States” might accordingly have been a distinctly imprudent thing
to write—especially at the very beginning of the Constitution.
Understood in either of these ways, the “herein granted”
language of the Vesting Clause does reflect a gap between the
legislative powers vested in Congress and the complete universe
of legislative power within the United States. On the first
interpretation, it reflects awareness that Congress lacked the
power to authorize or abrogate the Constitution. On the second,
it reflects awareness that Congress would coexist with state
legislatures. But neither of these interpretations points to the
enumerationist reading of the Vesting Clause. So long as the
states continued to legislate, and Congress never presumed to
abrogate the Constitution or establish another one, the limits
requiring the Vesting Clause to include the “herein granted”
language (rather than just saying “All legislative powers shall be
vested in a Congress . . .”) would be respected even if Congress
exercised some powers not affirmatively specified in the
Constitution.
In other words, neither of these explanations for the “herein
granted” language suggests that the legislative powers “herein
granted” are the sum total of congressional power. And as noted
earlier, the status of legislative powers other than those “herein
granted” is simply not specified by the text of Article I, Section 1.
99. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410 n.* (1792) (“The people of the
United States have vested in Congress all legislative powers granted in the constitution.
They have vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress shall
establish, ‘the judicial power of the United States.’ It is worthy of remark, that in Congress
the whole legislative power of the United States is not vested. An important part of that
power was exercised by the people themselves, when they ‘ordained and established the
constitution.’” (quoting the circuit court of the district of Pennsylvania)).
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Maybe Congress has such powers, and maybe it does not, but the
Vesting Clause does not decide the issue. What the Vesting
Clause says, on the plain-meaning interpretation, is that no one
but Congress is vested with the legislative powers herein granted,
not that Congress can exercise no powers but those. That is the
straightforward meaning of “All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE PLAIN-MEANING READING
The plain-meaning reading of the Vesting Clause makes
considerably more textual sense than the enumerationist reading.
But the plain-meaning reading can also be questioned, because its
central contention—that nobody but Congress is vested with
legislative powers granted by the Constitution—is open to
dispute. For example, within the same Founding-era scheme that
understood the Senate’s power to try impeachments as judicial
and its power over appointments as executive, two powers vested
in the President might be classified as legislative.100 They are the
veto power,101 which as a practical matter makes the President the
single most powerful person in the legislative process, and the
power to make treaties.102 If the President exercises legislative
power when doing those things, then it would not be true that the
100. At the New York ratifying convention, Hamilton described “legislative
authority” under the Constitution as “lodged in three distinct branches properly
balanced[.]” The New York Convention, in 22 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1921, 1953 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008). See
also MAIER, supra note 48, at 151–52, 513 n.79.
101. Blackstone described the monarch under the British constitution as exercising a
veto as “a constituent part of the supreme legislative power.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 253 (1769). Blackstone can also be read as
describing the veto as executive. See id. at 242–43. It may be reasonable to construe
Blackstone as taking the position that the veto is both of those things—which, to the extent
that Blackstone’s scheme is informative as to prominent conceptions among the Founders,
would be sufficient to make trouble for the proposition that only Congress can exercise
legislative power. Whether under the influence of Blackstone or otherwise, Americans at
the Founding did often describe the executive in the British government—that is, the
monarch—as wielding legislative as well as executive power. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST
NO. 47 (James Madison); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 553 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)
(statement of Rep. Jackson) (saying that, in Britain, “the Executive authority is connected
with, and forms a part of, the Legislative, and this upon Constitutional ground; it expands
itself further, and within its capacious grasp actually holds the Legislative as well as
Executive powers”).
102. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (writing that, in Britain,
“The executive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has
the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under
certain limitations, the force of legislative acts.”).
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Constitution vests legislative powers only in Congress.
A defender of the plain-meaning interpretation could push
back in several ways. For example, one might argue that “vesting”
a power means authorizing a party to exercise that power
completely, not authorizing that party to participate in the process
in which the power is exercised. We do not say, this argument
might run, that the power to lay taxes is vested in the House of
Representatives, nor in the Senate. It is vested in Congress. On
this view, the veto power vests no legislative power in the
President. Veto power gives the President influence in the
legislative process, but a veto never creates legislation, and
nothing the President does can create legislation without the
consent of Congress.103 In contrast, Congress—in which legislative
powers are vested—can legislate without the President if he
declines to act, or over his objection with sufficient
supermajorities. By the same token, the treaty power would also
not be “vested” in the President, because the President cannot
conclude treaties alone. He needs the approval of the Senate.
That solution to the treaty-power problem generates a new
problem for the plain-meaning reading of the Vesting Clause: it
prevents the treaty power from being vested in the President, but
in a way that entails the conclusion that the treaty power is not
vested in Congress either. A treaty, unlike a statute, is not
something that Congress can create without the President’s
participation. So if treaty-making is an exercise of legislative
power, the choice to regard a power as “vested” in a
decisionmaker only if that decisionmaker can exercise the power
unilaterally would not be consistent with the proposition that
Congress is vested with all legislative powers granted in the
Constitution.
But the defender of the plain-meaning interpretation has
responses available. For example, one could push back on the
characterization of treaty-making as legislative rather than
executive. Both views were available at the Founding, as was the
(probably more mature) view that it is neither entirely one thing

103. It is perhaps worthy of observation that when members of the Founding
generation characterized the President as having legislative power because of his power
within the legislative process, they discussed the power to veto bills rather than the power
to approve them, even though it is the power to approve bills that is the power to make
law. See, e.g., id. I will be grateful to readers who bring counterexamples to my attention.
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nor entirely the other.104 Alternatively, a defender of the plainmeaning interpretation might say that “herein granted” means
“granted in Article I,” not “granted in the Constitution”—in
which case treaty-making is irrelevant, because the treaty power
appears in Article II, not in Article I.105 One might even deny that
the treaty-making power is “granted” by the Constitution at all,
on the theory that it was a power already enjoyed by the United
States under the Articles of Confederation.106
Reasonable people might have varying opinions about
whether these responses successfully defend the plain-meaning
interpretation of the Vesting Clause. My own sense is that the
attractiveness of the plain-meaning interpretation, all things
considered, is partly a function of how committed one is to the
idea that the difference in syntax between Article I’s Vesting
Clause and the other Vesting Clauses must reflect something
substantive in constitutional law. If the difference in syntax must
mean something, then the plain-meaning interpretation is
defensible enough to adopt without much worry. It certainly
seems more defensible than the enumerationist reading, both
because it is more faithful to the Constitution’s words and because
it is less at odds with Founding-era understandings of what powers
were vested in Congress.
III. THE DRAFTING-PROCESS READING
A. THE LIMITS OF CLOSE READING
There is also a third possibility. Perhaps the difference in
syntax between the Vesting Clause of Article I and the Vesting
Clauses of Articles II and III should not be read to reflect any
substantive feature of constitutional law. The reasonable case for
this view begins with the recognition that not every tic of language

104. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton). Whether the
President’s power in the treaty-making process should be thought of as legislative,
executive, or both might depend on a substantive question as well as a conceptual one:
different people at the Founding may have had different visions of what the President (or
his agents) would actually do during negotiations with foreign governments. The more one
imagines the President (or his agents) making substantive decisions about what policies to
promote or agree to in treaties, the more the function seems legislative. The more one
imagines that the President (or his agents) conducting negotiations within specific policy
constraints crafted by Congress, the more the function seems executive.
105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
106. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX.
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is significant, even in the Constitution. After all, the Constitution
is a complex document, drafted by committees and worked over
in an even larger group. Anyone who has had the experience of
drafting documents under analogous conditions should know that
the product, even when good, is unlikely to be tight and elegant in
every respect. Even as applied to single-authored documents
written by good writers, the assumption that every word choice is
careful and significant, or that every clause is written with every
other clause in mind, would often yield false inferences. When a
document in question is written and edited by committee, those
assumptions are even more misplaced.107
Moreover, the drafters of the Constitution probably paid less
attention to specific choices about wording than later interpreters
of the work have.108 The practice of reading the text closely for
implications and shades of meaning seems to have intensified
during the disputations of the ratification process,109 with the
result that the text was quickly (and has ever since been) subjected
to more exacting analyses than it was consciously written to bear.
To be sure, it does not follow that we should dismiss close reading
as a modality of constitutional decisionmaking or as a tool for
understanding the intent of the Framers. Where something seems
irregular about enacted language, it makes sense for interpreters
to try to figure out whether the irregularity signals something
substantive (and if so, what in particular it signals). But sometimes
the wisest conclusion, after due investigation, is that nothing
substantive depends on a provision’s being worded one way
rather than another.
Notice that constitutional lawyers’ impulse to treat
107. The idea that the Constitution’s text can be interpreted on the assumption that
every word is there for a reason and that the document’s text is something like a perfect
system might be, in part, a product of a cultural tendency to venerate the Constitution as
divinely inspired. After all, those interpretive conventions are common within some
traditional approaches to the interpretation of a different sacred text—the Bible—and
some habits of interpretation may carry over from one context to the other. See LEVINSON,
supra note 39 (discussing relationships between biblical and constitutional interpretation).
But whatever the merits of such interpretive approaches might be in the Biblical context,
the Constitution should be understood to be sufficiently unlike the Bible so as to make
those approaches unwarranted. For one thing, one of the background assumptions
animating the idea that the Bible is properly interpreted as a perfectly spare and elegant
document is that the author of the document is perfect and omniscient. Whether it follows
that trying to read the Constitution similarly is merely misguided or also idolatrous is a
question that different people will answer differently.
108. GIENAPP, supra note 42.
109. Id. at 87–104.
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differences in phrasing as significant is selective. There are textual
anomalies in the Constitution that we glide right by. One of them
is even present in the specific context of the three Vesting Clauses.
Twenty-first century constitutional lawyers make much of the fact
that the phrasing of the Article I Vesting Clause differs from that
of the Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses—but the Vesting
Clauses of Articles II and III are not fully parallel to each other
either, and nobody seems to care. Article II begins “The executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States.”110 In
contrast, Article III begins “The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court. . . .”111 Why is the
judicial power but not the executive power described as a power
“of the United States”? This is not a question that constitutional
lawyers worry about, and reasonably not. The difference between
the first Clauses of Articles II and III and the first Clause of
Article I might be no more significant.
At the time of the Founding—more specifically, from the
time that the constitutional text was drafted until Hamilton’s first
Pacificus letter in 1793—it seems that the difference in phrasing
between Article I’s Vesting Clause and the Vesting Clauses of
Articles II and III was one that readers passed over with as little
thought as is now given to the nonparallel phrasing of the latter
two Vesting Clauses. Not only is there virtually no evidence that
readers considered the distinctive phrasing of Article I’s Vesting
Clause significant, but there are several recorded instances of
well-informed readers speaking affirmatively as if the three
Vesting Clauses were fully parallel. In the removal debate, for
example, Richard Bland Lee is recorded as saying that the
Constitution creates “three principal branches, with express
declarations, that all Legislative power shall vest in one, all
Executive in another, and the whole Judicial in a third.”112 It is
common, of course, for even generally competent readers to
describe a proposition as “express” in the Constitution even when

110. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
111. Id. art. III, § 1.
112. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 525 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. R.B.
Lee). Lee was, of course, a member of Virginia’s Lee dynasty: he was the cousin of Richard
Henry Lee, the brother of General Henry (“Light-Horse Harry”) Lee and General (later
Attorney General) Charles Lee, and the uncle of Robert E. Lee. See generally PETER
STONE & SHERMAN EDWARDS, The Lees of Old Virginia, in 1776: A MUSICAL PLAY 10,
10–19 (1976) (1969). In the House of Representatives, Lee represented the portion of
Virginia that included Mount Vernon, which made President Washington his constituent.
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the words of the Constitution do not state that proposition.113 But
they generally do so when the meaning they attribute to the
Constitution is well within prevailing expectations about what the
Constitution directs. If the Founders generally thought that
Article I’s Vesting Clause was worded differently from the other
two Vesting Clauses so as to make the point that Congress was
vested with less than all legislative power, Members of Congress
probably would not have asserted that “all Legislative power” was
vested in Congress just as all executive power is vested in the
President—let alone that the arrangement was directed by
“express declarations.”114 Similarly, and again in the removal
debate, Alexander White argued that deeming the President to
enjoy all executive power that the Constitution did not specifically
except would also mean that Congress enjoyed all legislative
power that the Constitution did not specifically except.115 No
properly socialized modern constitutional lawyer would make this
statement, because the modern lawyer knows to read the
difference in the two Vesting Clauses to mean that Congress and
the President are different in just this way. In 1789, that
proposition was not apparent.
B. MAKING THE SAUSAGE
Attention to the Constitution’s drafting history suggests that
the nonparallel phrasing of the three Vesting Clauses may have
come about for reasons having nothing to do with distinctive
limits on congressional power.116 The Convention’s first draft of a
113. Cf. LESSIG, supra note 6, describing the enumerationist reading of Article I,
Section 1 as “explicitly clear.”
114. The Annals of Congress are not a stenographic transcript of the proceedings, so
one cannot be certain that the words as they appear in that source were exactly the words
spoken on the floor of Congress. But if Lee did not actually use these words, this passage
from the Annals would still suggest that asserting that the Constitution “expressly” vested
“all Legislative power” in Congress was not a sufficiently bizarre statement so as to prevent
the compilers of the Annals from rendering Lee’s speech that way (If the notes from which
the Annals were compiled seemed to indicate that Lee had said that Congress had three
branches rather than two, the compilers might have paused to make sure they hadn’t
garbled Lee’s remarks.).
115. See also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 513–14 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement
of Rep. White) (arguing that the relationship between Congress and the legislative power
is the same as the relationship between the President and the executive power). In the first
two Congresses, White represented a portion of western Virginia that now lies within the
state of West Virginia. He subsequently served, at President Washington’s appointment,
as one of the three commissioners on the board charged with planning the nation’s new
capital city in the District of Columbia.
116. The account that follows is partly inspired by material discussed in John Mikhail,
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full proposed Constitution was presented by the Committee of
Detail on August 6, 1787.117 Article I of that draft, in its entirety,
said that “The stile of the [] Government shall be, ‘The United
States of America.’”118 Article II, also in its entirety, declared that
“The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive,
and judicial powers.”119 Article III then turned to the discussion
of specific institutional arrangements, beginning with the words
“The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress[.]”120 There
was no mention of powers “herein granted.” Congress’s Vesting
Clause was, in that respect, perfectly parallel to the subsequent
vesting clauses for the President (“The Executive Power of the
United States shall be vested in a single person.”)121 and the courts
(“The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall . . . be
constituted by the Legislature of the United States.”).122
This draft lay before the Convention from August 6 to
September 12. Most of the Convention’s discussions of specific
congressional powers took place during that time.123 While those
discussions occurred, nothing in the proposed constitutional text
suggested that Congress was getting a smaller share of “the
legislative power” than the other branches were getting of “the
executive power” and “the judicial power.” So far as appears from
the surviving records, no one objected to the parallel
formulations. No one suggested that the legislative Vesting
Clause needed to be changed to say that Congress had only the
powers “herein granted,” nor that it should be changed in any
other way that would reflect a choice to limit Congress to the
subsequently specified powers only.
In September, the Committee of Style turned the August 6
draft into something close to the constitutional text that was
ultimately adopted.124 Among other changes, it eliminated the
The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1100, 1104 (2014).
117. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 177 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 185.
122. Id. at 186.
123. See, e.g., id. at 303–13, 321–24, 337–39, 354–64, 447–56, 497, 508–10.
124. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener:
Gouverneur Morris and the Creation of the Federalist Constitution, 119 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (describing the work of the Committee of Style).
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prior draft’s first two Articles.125 Article III thus became Article I
by default. But Article III had not been written to be the
document’s opening article. It had been written to follow the two
introductory articles that were now gone—the ones declaring that
“The stile of the Government shall be, ‘The United States of
America’” and that “The Government shall consist of the
supreme legislative, executive, and judicial powers.” Without
those two articles, the first words of what would now be Article
I—“The legislative power”—would have no antecedent
reference. The Committee of Detail’s draft flowed: Article I
introduced the government, Article II stated that that
government would have a legislative power, and Article III
explained where that legislative power would be vested. To
instead jump right in with a sentence about some heretofore
unmentioned thing called “the legislative power” may have
seemed awkward. Changing the language to read “All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested . . .” might have been
nothing more than the draftsman’s solution to that problem: it let
the new Article I begin with a more introductory flavor. If so, and
given that virtually nobody in the ratification debates or the First
Congress treated the Vesting Clause’s distinctive wording as
significant, it seems reasonable to think that the Clause’s syntax is
better explained as an artifact of the drafting process than as the
reflection of some substantive commitment about the limited
power of Congress.
If that origin story is reasonably accurate—and I do not claim
to have done more than make it plausible—then it would be
reasonable to understand the Vesting Clauses in either of two
125. One can speculate about why those Articles were eliminated. One possibility is
that they were simply casualties of the Committee of Style’s larger decision to reduce the
number of Articles. The draft produced by the Committee of Detail had twenty-three
articles; the Committee of Style returned a slightly shorter document with only seven.
Substantively, perhaps the Committee thought that the first two Articles of the prior draft
were too provocative when read in comparison with the first two Articles of the Articles
of Confederation. The first Article of the Articles of Confederation read “The Stile of this
Confederacy shall be ‘The United States of America.’” Article I in the Committee of
Detail’s draft changed “Confederacy” to “Government,” thus suggesting rather plainly
that the new arrangement was more than “confederated.” Article II in the Articles of
Confederation read “Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and
every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated
to the United States, in Congress assembled.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781,
art. II. Replacing that language with “The Government shall consist of the supreme
legislative, executive, and judicial powers” would have been a pretty bold statement. But
this possibility is speculative: existing records do not explain the choice.
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ways. First, they might be best understood not as operative
provisions whose texts are finely crafted to allocate power in
distinctive ways but as topic sentences for the first three Articles.
On this reading, Article I, Section I just means “Now we’re going
to talk about Congress, which is generally in the legislation
business,” and the first sections of Articles II and III mean the
same thing, mutatis mutandis, for the President and the courts.
Alternatively, the Vesting Clauses might do a bit more than
introduce the branches: they might introduce the branches and
say, substantively, that each branch is the normal or default
exerciser of a certain kind of power. But on either reading, it is a
mistake to think that the difference in syntax between Article I
and the other Articles means that anything distinctive is
happening in Article I.
CONCLUSION
Within the practice of American constitutional law, it is
perfectly normal to read clauses to mean things that the drafters
and ratifiers would not have expected.126 But the recognition that
the Convention probably did not mean to signal anything
substantive by writing “All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested . . .” rather than “The legislative power shall be
vested . . .” might make it easier for constitutional lawyers to
question the claim that the wording directs us to take a particular
attitude toward the limits of congressional power. When one also
recognizes that the words of the Clause do not say that Congress
is vested only with the legislative powers herein granted, the case
for the enumerationist reading of the Clause becomes quite thin.
At most, it is an idea hung on a clause, rather than an idea that
fidelity to the text requires.
Reading closely is an important part of legal interpretation.
It is appropriate for constitutional decisionmakers to notice that
the wording of Article I’s Vesting Clause is not parallel to that of
the other Vesting Clauses and to ask whether something
substantive follows. Indeed, it is more than appropriate; it is an
exercise of basic competence in constitutional interpretation. But
126. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (“The Federal
Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the
Framers . . . . Yet the powers conferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution
were phrased in language broad enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal
Government’s role.”).
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if one has tried to attribute significance to the difference between
two texts and come up only with unsatisfying possibilities, it may
be wise to conclude that the textual difference should not make a
substantive difference in law.
The enumerationist reading of the Vesting Clause reads “all”
to mean “only,” blinks at the possibility that the Constitution gave
Congress powers beyond the “legislative powers herein granted”
because it gave Congress powers that are not legislative at all, and
attributes to the clause a meaning that nobody in the ratification
debates or the First Congress seemed to find there, despite ample
opportunity and incentive to do so. The plain-meaning reading is
better: readers who would like to attribute substantive
significance to the Clause’s distinctive syntax could reasonably
adopt it. But in the end, the best interpretation of Article I,
Section 1 might not try to find meaning at the level of reading
word by word. The wording may be a happenstance of drafting,
and the sense of the Clause might simply be “Now we’re going to
talk about Congress, which is, more or less, a legislature.” On
either that conception or the plain-meaning reading, the Vesting
Clause does not support the claim that Congress may exercise
only the powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution. That
so many leading constitutional lawyers have thought otherwise,
even to the point of thinking the proposition “explicitly clear,”127
is a testament to the power that orthodox thinking about
enumerated powers has to shape—and distort—the reading of the
Constitution.

127. LESSIG, supra note 6, at 75.

